Permissive planning: extending classical planning to uncertain task domains  by DeJong, Gerald F. & Bennett, Scott W.
Artificial Intelligence 89 ( 1997) 173-217 
Artif’icial 
Intelligence 
Permissive planning: 
extending classical planning to uncertain task 
domains 
Gerald F. DeJongayb-*, Scott W. Bennett c 
a Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 405 North Matthews Ave., 
Urbana, IL 61801, USA 
h Beckman Instihde, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 405 North Matthews Ave., 
Urbana, IL 61801, USA 
’ SRA Corporation, 2000 15th St. North, Arlington, VA, USA 
Received May 1995; revised July 1996 
Abstract 
Uncertainty, inherent in most real-world domains, can cause failure of apparently sound classical 
plans. On the other hand, reasoning with representations that explicitly reflect uncertainty can 
engender significant, even prohibitive, additional computational costs. This paper contributes a 
novel approach to planning in uncertain domains. The approach is an extension of classical 
planning. Machine learning is employed to adjust planner bias in response to execution failures. 
Thus, the classical planner is conditioned towards producing plans that tend to work when executed 
in the world. 
The planner’s representations are simple and crisp; uncertainty is represented and reasoned about 
only during learning. The user-supplied domain theory is left intact. The operator definitions and 
the planner’s projection ability remain as the domain expert intended them. Some structuring 
of the planner’s bias space is required. But with suitable structuring the approach scales well. 
The learning converges using no more than a polynomial number of examples. The system then 
probabilistically guarantees that either the plans produced will achieve their goal when executed or 
that adequate planning is not possible with the domain theory provided. An implemented robotic 
system is described. 
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1. Introduction 
We seek a formal bridge between classical planning and real-world goal achieve- 
ment. The chasm to be spanned is wide and deep. Classical planners are concerned 
with behavior in micro-worlds, hypothetical worlds that can be flawlessly formalized. 
Classical plans are often thwarted by the real world; a sequence of actions may be 
proven to achieve a micro-world goal only to produce an unacceptable real-world state 
when executed. We can trust that the micro-world behavior is indicative of real-world 
performance only if the planner’s representations perfectly capture all relevant details 
of the real world. This is seldom the case. Often, the planner’s domain representations 
only approximate their real-world changes. Combinations of apparently innocuous flaws 
may conspire to invalidate a plan in the real world. 
One cause of this difficulty is the qualification problem [46], which is succinctly 
stated by Genesereth and Nilsson [ 271: 
Most universally quantified statements will have to include an infinite number of 
qualifications if they are to be interpreted as accurate statements about the world. 
Classical operator definitions are universally quantified first order expressions and 
can, therefore, only imperfectly capture most real-world changes. Representations of the 
initial world state may also be imperfect. Thus, it is inescapable that a planner may 
encounter situations in which its conclusions will contradict the real world. 
Permissive planning is a learning approach to planning under uncertainty. To illustrate 
it, consider the simple problem of making breakfast in the morning. The initial state 
of our kitchen includes many standard cooking ingredients: milk, flour, eggs, butter, 
containers of hot and cold cereal, syrup, a selection of fresh and dried fruit, etc. The 
goal is to reduce our morning hunger. Operators include pouring, measuring, mixing, 
heating, and so on. There are many possible solutions our planner could in principle 
produce for us. It could make pancakes, crepes, Belgian waffles, hot oatmeal, cold raisin 
bran, sausage and eggs, gravy and biscuits, eggs Benedict, etc. We call the set of all 
solutions that could in principle be produced the cdmpetence set of the planner for the 
problem. In fact, of course, the planner will not generate all solutions; it will construct 
just one. This designated element of the competence set we call the performance item 
of the planner for the problem. We call the preference for a particular performance item 
from the competence set the planner’s bias. As we shall see, bias is an inescapable facet 
of planning, and its adjustment is at the heart of permissive planning. 
Suppose that the planner’s performance item for the breakfast problem is to prepare 
eggs Benedict. Goal achievement is, of course, entailed in the planner’s micro-world, but 
the result in the real world may be quite unsatisfactory. A perfectly reasonable looking 
plan might result in lumpy and separated hollandaise sauce reducing the eggs Benedict 
dish to a disgusting tasteless mess. The problem is that one or more of the system’s 
internal representations are not sufficiently faithful to reality for the plan to succeed. 
Perhaps some initial state representations are subtly wrong-the eggs are warmer than 
represented or the butter is too low a grade, or perhaps the operators are incorrect, 
incomplete, or based upon false suppositions-the blender may not beat as fast as 
believed or the beating may result in an unmodeled heating of the mixture. Most likely 
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the blame cannot be laid at a single representation. Usually multiple discrepancies, each 
of which is slight, conspire together to produce the failure. 
Permissive planning, when confronted with an unacceptable failure rate, adjusts the 
planner bias. This shifts the solutions to different performance items. For breakfast a 
different eggs Benedict recipe might be attempted or perhaps a different dish entirely is 
prepared. There are nearly always planning alternatives within the micro-world frame- 
work; few problems admit to only a single solution. It is foolish to persist making foul 
eggs Benedict ignoring all the attractive other breakfast options. 
Why might preserving the micro-world be desirable? The system’s operator represen- 
tations are typically provided by a human domain expert. Presumably, the expert did his 
best at capturing his own coherent although possibly idiosyncratic conceptualization of 
world change. The qualification problem assures us that imperfections are unavoidable. 
Stumbling upon one is to be expected and is hardly evidence that the system can im- 
prove upon the work of the domain expert. Furthermore, tinkering with human-supplied 
knowledge may corrupt its faithfulness to the expert’s conceptualization and introduce 
latent inconsistencies of a far worse nature. On the other hand, the planner’s intial bias 
is likely to be quite arbitrary. It is supplied by the planner implementor and reflects little 
or no understanding of the domain. And yet each bias has grave implications for the 
planner’s success in particular domains. It may be more prudent to alter the bias over 
the domain representations. 
A major issue raised by permissive planning is that bias is a characteristic of the 
planner as a whole. Altering the bias may shift the performance element produced for 
many problems at once. It may be that the solutions generated with the old bias were 
quite acceptable but the plans now produced lead to real-world failures. Permissive 
planning must provide some guarantee of global acceptable behavior. Much of our 
research concerns this point. 
Let us briefly examine how permissive planning relates to other approaches to un- 
certainty. These fall into three general categories. In the first, reasoning systems are 
provided with some explicit account of uncertainty and how it is propagated [ 181. This 
general approach includes Bayesian reasoning [ 15,661, planning with error balls [ 251, 
fuzzy logic [ 871, and decision theoretic approaches to planning [ 19,30,3 1,741. Systems 
in this general area are given representations of the world that are more sophisticated 
than required by conventional classical planning. These representations include some 
characterization of possible discrepancies that are likely to be encountered. The planner 
takes such variabilities into account in deciding how best to behave in the world. We 
can view each representation as specifying a potentially large disjunction of facts. Thus, 
each representation is less likely to be violated in the real world. Importantly, there is 
cost in reasoning with augmented representations which can be quite high [ 731. 
In the second approach, machine learning is employed to refine the offending repre- 
sentations. As in classical planning, the system’s action and object representations are 
simple and precise but possibly incorrect. As the system interacts with the world, it gains 
information through its observations. The domain theory is suitably modified to bring it 
into line with the observed world behavior. This can be seen as an induction problem: 
The hypothesis space consists of some (usually large) set of well-formed alterations of 
the initial domain theory. Examples are the observed real-world behaviors. The task is 
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to locate the hypothesis that best fits the examples. This may involve general theory re- 
finement and discovery (e.g. [ 61,64,65,70] ) or, more conservatively, operator learning 
and refinement (e.g. [ 28,35,83] ). The reasearch connecting belief revision and update 
with theories of action [ 11,23,40] is also relevant. 
The third approach relies on reactivity [ 1,12,49,60,76]. While conventional plan ex- 
ecution blindly applies the sequence of the planner-specified operators, a reactive system 
achieves robustness by extending execution to include some degree of world monitoring 
and decision making. Reliance on action projection is reduced or eliminated; the world 
is not assumed to behave precisely as anticipated at planning time. The “plan” bears 
little resemblance to a classical plan. Typically, it is composed of a large number of 
what-if decisions that specify actions for the world states likely to be encountered. It is 
perhaps better termed a policy for acting rather than a plan. Goal achievement emerges 
from the interactions of this policy with the dynamics of the world. While not essen- 
tial, machine learning can be incorporated for the purpose of automating plan/policy 
construction [ 7,16,29,36,54,80]. 
Each of these three general approaches suggests a different class of solutions to the 
breakfast problem. In the first one, representations are enhanced to encode uncertainty 
information. Solutions are produced which are less sensitive (perhaps even minimally 
sensitive) to these uncertainties. For eggs Benedict the system might have selected a 
less exacting but less tasty initial hollandaise sauce recipe from the Anyone can Cook 
cookbook. Or perhaps it would make a fool-proof breakfast of cold cereal with milk. The 
second approach employs machine learning to revise the faulty world knowledge. By 
examining the lumpy sauce or perhaps through additional eggs Benedict experiences, 
the system concludes that the “whip” speed of this blender is significantly slower 
than previously believed. Or perhaps it determines that the brand of butter used is 
insufficiently homogenized. In any case, its internal projection ability is brought into line 
with observed reality. With the refinement it may be able to produce a more satisfactory 
eggs Benedict. Third, reactivity monitors the world after each operator execution. The 
next action is chosen to bring the observed world closer to a goal state. After pouring 
the melted butter the system observes undesirable lumps in the sauce. It may decide 
to add oil or to heat the mixture or to go next door to borrow the neighbor’s BlenzAll 
super blender. Crucially, the system does not anticipate and plan around failures. Rather 
it attempts to recover from them as they are detected. 
Permissive planning is cast from a somewhat different mold. It is unlike the first 
in that the representations of world objects and actions are crisp, simple, and precise 
encoding no information about expected uncertainty. Unlike the second approach, the 
domain knowledge-the system’s represented beliefs about the world-are never altered. 
Finally, it is unlike the third in that it preserves the notion of a classical plan. Projection 
plays an important role in permissive planning and there are no execution-time action 
decisions. 
Permissive planning is not the final word in planning under uncertainty. The ultimate 
treatment of uncertainty will most likely combine aspects of all of these approaches. 
But permissive planning is a promising and as yet little explored direction. 
The permissive approach can be briefly summarized as follows: A planner can be 
characterized as having parameters that influence its search for a solution. Each combi- 
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Fig. 1. Classical planning. 
nation of settings for these parameters causes some bias to be exhibited by the planner. 
The collection of all biases forms the planner’s bias space. Machine learning is employed 
to search this space for a bias element that yields acceptable planner performance for 
the kinds of problems the planner finds itself solving. Permissive planning is so named 
because the planner is adjusted to be permissive of less than perfect domain knowl- 
edge. 
Many tradeoffs and alternatives are possible within this general approach. We de- 
fine ideal permissive planning, one of the least restrictive and most naively appealing 
versions, and prove that it cannot be computed. We then investigate one alternative 
embodying a particular set of restrictions which yields tractable permissive planning. 
Finally we illustrate the permissive planning approach applied to a real-world plan- 
ner. 
2. A model of classical planning 
In Sections 5 and 7 we build upon a particular characterization of classical planning. 
Here we present that characterization. For our purposes, a classical planner is a partially 
recursive algorithm that (a) inputs operator definitions, an initial state, and a goal 
description and, (b) outputs a set of constraints with the property that any sequence 
of ground operators consistent with the constraint set achieves the goal from the initial 
state in the micro-world defined by the operators. See Fig. 1. Note that there is no 
requirement that the operators be STRIPS-like [ 591. They may have conditional effect, 
internal quantification, etc. (see [67,85] ). We assume that the real-world counterpart 
is deterministic but is only approximated by the micro-world. 
All classical planners (be they linear, nonlinear, hierarchical, etc.) can be viewed 
as conducting a search through a tree of constraint sets. This view is close to the 
conventional one in which the search is through a space of plans [ 14,38,47,5 1,68, 
861. We interpret a constraint set as denoting the set of all action sequences (each a 
temporally ordered set of ground operators) that are consistent with the constraints of the 
set. A constraint set itself is inconsistent iff it denotes no action sequence. Each abstract 
planning step (each significant decision of the planner) adds a nontrivial constraint to 
the collection to generate a novel set of constraints. Each nontrivial constraint eliminates 
one or more action sequences that were consistent with the parent set. This defines a 
tree of constraint sets (see Fig. 2). 
While classical planning can be abstractly characterized in this way, we do not mean 
that every classical planning algorithm must be overtly implemented as a search through 
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Fig. 2. The constraint tree for a planning problem. 
a constraint space, or even that the constraints need be explicitly represented. However, 
the behavior of any classical planner can be accurately captured as such a search. 
In this view, the only difference between planners lies in their vocabulary of constraints 
and their method of exploring a planning problem’s tree of possible constraints (selecting 
which node of the tree to expand next). Although such difference results in quite different 
planners, it will be useful to ignore such details. In doing so, we are assured that our 
statements are general-applying to all classical planners. 
Once a vocabulary of constraints is adopted, a constraint tree such as that in Fig. 2 
can be associated with each planning problem. The root node (e.g., NO) is the empty set 
of constraints; it denotes all sequences of actions. The descendants of each node are the 
consistent constraint sets that can be formed by adding a single nontrivial constraint to 
the parent’s constraint set. Thus, each child node denotes strictly fewer action sequences 
than does its parent. A leaf node is one to which no consistent nontrivial constraint can 
be added. 
A node is a “success” node if the projection of the initial state through each and every 
action sequence denoted by its constraint set results in a goal state. In other words, the 
goal must be entailed by the initial state, the system’s world knowledge, and the node’s 
constraints. N2 is a success node. Success nodes may have descendants that are formed 
in the same manner as other children nodes. Every descendent of a success node (e.g., 
N3) is also a success node. This is necessarily the case: the child node’s additional 
constraint can only remove action sequences, and all the action sequences denoted by 
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the parent already solve the planning problem. A node is a “failure” node if it has 
no success descendants. An example of a failure node is Nl. Of course, many nodes, 
including NO, are neither success nor failure nodes. We call the set of all success nodes 
the competence set for the planning problem. 
Some planners may appear not to fit this characterization. Some apparently search 
beyond the boundaries of the constraint tree. However, we need not interpret such 
computation as extending the search tree: It can be computationally difficult to determine 
redundancy and inconsistency of constraints. An implemented planner may unknowingly 
add redundant constraints, simply not appreciating that they have no effect. Similarly, 
it may happily accrete additional constraints to a constraint set unknown to be already 
inconsistent until the inconsistency is more readily apparent. These two behaviors can 
be viewed as implementation details outside our formal treatment. From a computational 
point of view, all of the planner’s behavior relevant to constructing its plan is confined 
to a constraint search tree such as that shown in Fig. 2. 
3. Real-world planning and real-world adequacy 
Can we capture some notion of real-world planning adequacy within this general 
planning framework? To do so we must first define precisely what it means for a 
planner to be “adequate”. Informally, we might say that a planning system is adequate 
if its user is satisfied with the real-world performance. 
This informal definition sheds no light on how to attain planner adequacy but an 
important point becomes clear: the adequacy of a planner depends on more than its 
internal workings. Adequacy is measured against those problems that concern its user. 
A user who cares about stacking blocks in a simulated robot world might find a particular 
planner completely adequate. On the other hand, someone who schedules nation-wide 
rail freight deliveries might find the same planner quite inadequate. 
Intuitively we also prefer that a planner appreciate its own limitations. The best state 
of affairs from the point of view of a user is that when given a problem, the planner 
produces a solution that works when executed. The worst is that the planner produces a 
solution that actually fails in the world. The planner deciding not to attempt the problem 
is somewhere in between, for then the planner does not misrepresent its output although, 
of course, neither is the problem solved. 
We want a notion of planner adequacy consistent with the informal notions above. 
We begin with two different definitions of what it means to solve a planning problem. 
For the moment we assume that a plan denotes a particular sequence of actions that 
the planning system claims will solve the planning problem that gave rise to it. Of 
course, minimal commitment and nonlinear planners do not, in general, designate a 
single ground action sequence [ 14,39,45,68,75,81,86]. We will have more to say 
about this in the conclusion section. For the moment a plan is an individuated action 
sequence. 
A plan produced by a planning system ISolves (solves according to its own internal 
model of the world) a planning problem if the initial state projected through the plan 
satisfies the problem’s goal. We say that the plan ESolves (solves according to the 
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external world) a planning problem if the real-world state that results from executing 
the plan in the problem’s initial state satisfies the problem’s goal. As shorthand we will 
say a planning system ISolves (or ESolves) a problem if the performance item produced 
by the system ISolves (or ESolves) the problem. 
We assume the following operating protocol: A planning system is called upon to solve 
a succession of problems given to it one at a time. This succession is unlimited-there 
is always another problem available on which to test the planner’s behavior. Further, 
we assume that the problems are drawn according to a fixed but unknown distribution 
over a universe of well-formed problems. After some fixed amount of resources are 
expended on deliberation, the real-world planning system must either offer a solution 
to the planning problem (by outputting a plan) or choose not to offer a solution (by 
outputting the special symbol JI). Planning in this framework is decidable but only by 
the subterfuge of forcing an output of n after a resource bound is reached; in the real 
world systems cannot deliberate forever. 
We can now more precisely define the adequacy of a planning system: 
Definition 1. The adequacy of a planning system P over a universe of problems U 
randomly sampled according to a distribution D is: 
I 
c Pro(i) . a, if P ISolves i and P ESolves i, 
iEU 
AuDCP) = xPro(i) ./3, if P does not ISolve i, 
iEU 
(1) 
I c b(i) y, if P ISolves i but does not ESolve i, iEU 
where a, p, and y are constants satisfying y 6 p 6 0 < CY and Pro(i) is the probability 
of occurrence of problem i according to distribution D. 
This definition reflects a user’s concern for some problems above others (via the 
distribution) and is sufficiently expressive to distinguish between a plan failing and the 
planner choosing not to offer a plan. Thus, it is sensitive to the pre-theoretic notions 
discussed above. Each problem in the universe of problems contributes to a planner’s 
adequacy as follows: Producing a plan that works in the real world accrues a posi- 
tive reward ( CX). A penalty (p), which may be zero, is assessed for not producing a 
plan. A possibly more severe penalty (y) is assessed for producing a plan that does 
not work in the real world. Each problem contribution is weighted by the probability 
that the problem will be encountered according to the distribution. Other things being 
equal, adequacy is higher if offered plans actually work in the real world. Furthermore, 
producing a bad plan cannot be better (and may be worse) than producing no plan at 
all. Without loss of generality the definition could be simplified by setting cx identically 
equal to 1. But this somewhat obscures its influence in the analysis. Other formaliza- 
tions of adequacy are also possible but this one is simple, intuitive, and sufficient for 
our purposes. 
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4. Properties of planner adequacy 
There are several interesting properties that follow from the definition of adequacy 
given above. 
(1) The adequacy of any planning system is finite. In fact, it is bounded above by (Y 
and below by y. 
(2) No classical planner in the traditional AI sense can be assigned a meaningful 
adequacy rating. 
(3) Some form of machine learning is required to insure adequacy for a domain- 
independent planner. 
The first property follows directly from the convention that probabilities over a uni- 
verse sum to 1. If all problems ever asked of the planning system are correctly solved it 
will have an adequacy of (Y. If they are all solved incorrectly, the adequacy rating will 
be y. This makes direct comparisons between planners possible, even if the planners are 
operating in different domains and for different users. 
The second property is philosophically more interesting. It hints at how AI planning 
has so successfully ignored real-world performance. In domain-independent planning, 
a planner is only one factor in the adequacy assessment. Properties of the domain, 
characteristics of the problem distribution, and preferences from the user all contribute 
to a meaningful adequacy evaluation. With this in mind, property (2) is quite intuitive: 
classical domain-independent planning can guarantee reasonable adequacy only when 
the domain theory perfectly captures the real world so that ESolve and ISolve become 
the same relationship. 
The third property is related to the second and stems from the qualification problem. A 
planner’s adequacy is, among other things, a characterization of how well the planner’s 
operator representations characterize their corresponding real-world behaviors. Consider 
using prior knowledge (rather than machine learning) to characterize the operators’ real- 
world behavior. Only a set of operator representations that include no discrepancy with 
the real world would be sufficient to support guaranteed adequate domain-independent 
planning. The qualification problem assures us that, in general, this is not possible. Thus, 
knowledge of operator deficiencies with respect to the real world cannot, in general, be 
a priori. A characterization of a planner’s adequacy must be a posteriori, formed from 
observations of instances of real-world plan executions. Automatically characterizing 
observed instances is one definition of machine learning [48,53]. 
5. Bias and bias accommodation 
Any reasonable classical planner necessarily embodies a strong planning bias. Why 
should this be the case? Consider the characteristics of an unbiased planner. By defini- 
tion it must avoid expressing any preference for one solution over another. Furthermore, 
the lack of bias must hold for all problems and across all domains. There are only 
two unbiased behaviors possible. The first is to return all elements of the competence 
set at the same time. The second is to return n (failure) regardless of whether a so- 
lution exists. It is clear that both options are in most cases not reasonable. Resources 
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Fig. 3. The effect of altering a planner’s bias. 
should not be wasted finding solutions that will not be executed. Nor should a plan- 
ner capriciously fail to solve problems when at least one solution is easily within its 
grasp. 
Possessing a bias is not a disadvantage. Quite to the contrary: by its judicious use, 
one may prefer a solution that minimizes planning time, minimizes resources consumed 
during execution, or in the case of permissive planning, improves the likelihood of 
successful execution. However, it should be clear that bias is an unavoidable facet of 
classical planning even without taking real-world adequacy into account. 
Consider the effect of altering the bias of a planner. We will view bias change 
abstractly as the substitution of one preference function for another in the search across 
all problems’ constraint trees. We defer until later a mechanistic account of how such an 
alteration may be realized. The effect of such a substitution is illustrated in Fig. 3. Each 
element in the space labeled “Universe of Planning Problems” represents a well-formed 
problem that might be given to a classical planner. For each problem, the planner, with 
its original bias, conducts some search through the problem’s constraint tree. The original 
search path is represented as a light line in the triangle that represents the problem’s 
constraint tree. Using the new bias, most searches (like the one for problem P) will be 
quite different. Some (like that of problem R) may be only partially changed. Others 
(like the tree for problem Q) may remain unchanged. The solvability of the problem 
may change as well. Since classical planners are sound but not necessarily complete, a 
problem that is successfully solved by one preference function may be unsolvable under 
another. 
The important point for us is that by changing the preference function, the planner’s 
bias is altered. By altering the planner’s bias we may exert some control over which 
solution is found. This shift can be quite dramatic. The change of a single search choice 
can lead to a previously untouched portion of the constraint tree. 
Now consider a space of possible biases. The notion, though abstract, is well formed: 
the behavior of each planner can be described as the application of a particular preference 
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function to a constraint tree. Alternative preference functions result in different classical 
planners. A set of such preference functions forms a space of potential biases for the 
planner. 
Given a bias space, a planner, and some utility function defined over the universe of 
possible problems, it is entirely possible (indeed quite likely) that some planners will 
be of higher utility than others. By some form of systematic search through the bias 
space we might hope to find a planner whose utility is optimal, or nearly optimal, or at 
least higher than the utility of the original planner. 
We call such a search “accommodation” of the planner’s bias. Note that such a 
search changes none of the human-supplied information. The original operator set and 
constraint vocabulary, supplied by the planner’s implementor, are not altered. Permissive 
planning is bias accommodation using real-world planning adequacy as the measure of 
utility. 
Importantly, the planning system does not become better at anticipating the effects 
of its actions. Its internal representations remain as they were, and its projection ability 
is not altered. Rather permissive planning results in the generation of action sequences 
whose real-world behavior tends to more closely follow the sequences’ projected behav- 
iors. Execution effects come into line with projected effects rather than the other way 
around. 
6. Ideal permissive planning 
There are many different ways to instantiate the above abstract characterization of 
permissive planning. Unfortunately, the straightforward, ideal realization of permissive 
planning is computationally untenable. In ideal permissive planning the bias space is 
unrestricted. There are no known a priori constraints upon the individual biases that 
make up the space and the bias space may be infinite: 
Definition 2. Ideal permissive planning is a recursive procedure, that given: 
0 a planner, 
l a bias space, 
l adequacy values CY, /3, y, 
l a threshold of required adequacy, T,, between CY and p, 
l a source of planning problems, 
produces a new planner through bias accommodation that has the following properties: 
l if the bias space contains any bias of adequacy 2 T,, the bias with the highest 
adequacy is adopted, 
l if the space contains no bias of adequacy 2 T,, the new planner refuses to offer 
solutions to any further problem. 
The recursiveness of the procedure requires that the algorithm always halt. Therefore, 
only a finite number of example problems can be examined before either selecting a bias 
or guaranteeing that no adequate bias exists. Under these conditions are incompatible 
with permissive planning: 
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Theorem 3. Ideal permissive planning cannot be realized. 
This theorem follows directly from a lemma to which we now turn. The lemma 
concerns simpli’ed ideal permissive planning, a greatly restricted version of the ideal 
formulation. In simplified ideal permissive planning, the bias space contains exactly two 
biases. After attempting to solve a finite number of example problems, the better of 
the two biases must be selected. Problems for which the planner offers no solution, are 
counted as failures (y = /3). 
Lemma 4. The simplijed formulation of ideal permissive planning cannot be realized. 
The proofs are given in the appendix. The proofs of these results, like many proofs, 
are themselves somewhat unenlightening. Before proceeding to the positive results it is 
useful to develop an intuition for why in particular Lemma 4 holds. We can then more 
easily appreciate how the upcoming theorems avoid the computational pitfalls. 
A successful permissive planning algorithm for the simplified formulation must begin 
by solving a first sample problem using one of the two possible biases. The solu- 
tion constructed by the planner under the sampled bias is then executed in the real 
world. The outcome will either be a success (in the case that the goal was actually 
achieved) or a failure (if no solution was proposed, or if executing the plan in the 
world does not achieve the goal). If only we could know that one bias was always 
successful and the other was always unsuccessful, then one sample problem, regard- 
less of its outcome, would be sufficient to choose the better bias once and for all: 
if the sample plan is successful, select the bias and quit; if it is unsuccessful, select 
the alternate bias and quit. But such knowledge is disallowed under condition (a) 
above. Even the better bias may often yield a failing plan. To be optimal, the bias 
need only do better, on average, than the alternative bias. This decision can be made 
to be arbitrarily difficult and thus no algorithm can in general guarantee a final correct 
decision. 
What can we say about the description of the success/failure sequence due to a 
particular bias? With the bias held constant, the sequence of experienced successes and 
failures is entirely due to the sequence of world problems. Since these are, by hypothesis, 
drawn randomly (though, of course, according to some unknown fixed distribution), the 
outcome of sampling a particular bias can be viewed as a random variable. Since the 
outcome distribution is binomial (each observation of the bias’s performance yields one 
of two possible outcomes: real-world success or real-world failure) the bias variables 
are said to be Bernoulli. A Bernoulli variable is characterized by a single probability: 
if the likelihood of one outcome (success) is p (with 0 < p < 1) then the likelihood 
of the other (failure) is 1 - p. Let BI be the random variable associated with the 
first bias and let its probability of a successful outcome be ~1. Similarly define B2 
and p2 for the second bias. The parameters p1 and p2 are unknown but fixed; they 
reflect the underlying fixed distribution over the universe of problems. The adequacy 
of the first bias is plcv + (1 - p~)y or p1 ( LY - y) + y. Similarly the second bias’s 
adequacy is &a - y) + y. Thus, and intuitively, the first bias is an optimal bias iff 
PI 3 p2. 
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We now view this as a bandit problem. The discrete time, finite horizon, minimax 
bandit problem with two Bernoulli arms [9] can be conceptualized by analogy to a 
gambling machine. Suppose we are required to play N trials (hence discrete time with 
a finite horizon of N). At each trial we must pull one or the other arm of the two-arm 
bandit. After being pulled the arm randomly succeeds yielding a fixed reward, or fails 
yielding no reward (neither the amount of the reward nor the possible existence of a 
fixed penalty for pulling the arm affects the analysis). Thus, the arms are Bernoulli 
variables. The probability of payoff of each arm, though fixed, is unknown; additional 
knowledge of each arm’s characteristics is limited to the observations of prior trials. 
We wish to discover a strategy (a decision procedure for selecting Arm1 or Arm2 at 
step i possibly making use of the results of steps 1 through i - 1) that maximizes our 
expected wealth at the end of the N trials regardless of the payoff probabilities. Clearly, 
this is a problem of incomplete knowledge, for if we knew the payoff probabilities of 
both arms, then the solution, for any N, is simply always to pull the higher probability 
arm. 
The regret function for a decision strategy applied to a bandit is the accumulated 
difference between the expected payoff (the average over repeatedly following of the 
strategy up to N) and the omniscient optimal payoff (playing the higher probability 
arm N times). By definition, no strategy can, on average, win against the omniscient 
optimal strategy, so the regret function must clearly be nonnegative for all realizable 
strategies. If some realizable strategy could always discover the better arm after some 
finite number of trials m (less than N) then we would expect the regret function to 
be flat from the mth through the Nth trial. Indeed for any N’ larger than N, the regret 
function would accumulate no further deficit compared to the omniscient strategy. A 
successful permissive planning algorithm would select and continue to apply the better 
of the two biases after observing a finite number of samples. When considered as a 
bandit strategy, a permissive planning algorithm would result in a regret function that is 
comtunt as N grows beyond m. The established result from the bandit literature is that 
the regret function for the optimal realizable strategy cannot be flat. In fact it grows as 
fi as N grows without bound [ 31. 
For us, the significant feature is that the regret function cannot be flat. This follows 
from the requirement of global optimality. Any belief in the superiority of one arm 
becomes more certain with more confirming observations, but it cannot be guaranteed 
by any finite sample set. The average payoff probabilities between two bandit arms may 
be slight but with high variances, making the comparative evaluation arbitrarily difficult. 
If one commits to an arm to play for all the remaining opportunities, there will always 
be some chance it is the wrong arm. In the unbounded case, where horizon (the number 
of trials we care about) is infinite, the accumulated deficit (and therefore the regret 
function) can grow without bound. On the other hand, if we never select an arm to play 
once and for all, then we condemn ourselves to sample both arms unboundedly often 
(including the less desirable arm, whichever one it is). Again we incur an unboundedly 
large deficit. Thus, under these assumptions the regret function must continue to grow 
as the horizon recedes. Without an asymptotically flat regret function, no successful 
permissive planning algorithm can be realized. To be computationally viable, permissive 
planning must sidestep these difficulties. 
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7. With restrictions, permissive planning is tractable 
Fortunately these negative results are not the last word on permissive planning. We 
now show that a particularly simple kind of permissive planning, that we call restricted 
permissive planning, is tractable. While we give only a single tractable method, there 
are two features that all tractable approaches must share: we cannot insist on global 
optimality and some structure must exist within the bias space. 
Abandoning guaranteed optimality is a necessary step. We will content ourselves with 
some sufficient specified adequacy. Furthermore, we allow a small nonzero adequacy 
tolerance parameter E that establishes an indifference region about the adequacy thresh- 
old. Our interpretation of this region is that if the adequacy of the best bias in the space 
falls within fs of the threshold we are indifferent to the outcome. The procedure may 
either adopt the bias as adequate or the planner may decide there is no adequate bias and 
choose not to solve further problems. Finally, restricted permissive planning need meet 
its goals only with a high probability. In particular we include a confidence parameter S 
that specifies an acceptable probability that the permissive planning algorithm terminates 
with an inadequate bias which it misrepresents as adequate. More formally: 
Definition 5. Restricted permissive planning is a recursive procedure, that is given: 
0 a planner, 
l a bias space, 
l adequacy values CY, /3, y, 
a a threshold of required adequacy, TO, between a and p, 
l a source of planning problems, 
l two parameters, E and 6 both between 0 and 1, 
produces a new planner through bias accommodation that with probability at least 1 - S 
has the following properties: 
l if the bias space contains any bias of adequacy > T, + E, some bias with adequacy 
of at least T, - E will be adopted, 
l if the space contains no bias of adequacy > T,, -F, the new planner refuses to offer 
solutions to any further problem, 
l if the best bias in the space falls within the indifference range of T, f E then the 
planner may either adopt a bias of adequacy > T,, - E, or refuse to offer solutions 
to further problems. 
The e/a arrangement is borrowed from the PAC literature [82] and also earlier 
employed in [4]. From this point in the paper on, when we mention adequacy we will 
understand it to mean probabilistic attainment of an e-adequacy threshold. 
From ( 1) it is clear that the meaningful values of TO are between cy and p. For 
values < p, adequacy is no higher than the trivial planner that always returns A. On the 
other side, values > a are not realizable. It will occasionally be useful to consider a 
normalized utility parameter 0 in place of T,. It takes on values over the interval (0, 1) 
as T,, varies between p and LY. 
Definition 6. The normalized utility parameter, 0, is (T,, - j3) / (a - /3) 
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7.1. Schema-based planners 
The lack of structure among bias space elements is another foe of tractability, Inde- 
pendence of bias elements means that evidence for or against the adequacy of one bias 
cannot count as evidence for or against another bias. Thus, under independence, any 
reasonable search of the bias space has an algorithmic complexity bounded below of lin- 
ear growth in the size of the bias space. This is well within the accepted computational 
complexity bound for tractability (which is polynomial growth). However, the size of 
the bias space may itself be extremely large, even unbounded. Even with an efficient 
algorithm yielding a small constant, this may be unacceptable. To be more realistic, we 
will insist that the search complexity grow much slower than linearly with the size of 
the bias space. 
Interdependence often complicates system analysis, but a bias space is a special kind 
of system. It captures whatever flexibility exists for bias adjustment. The assumption of 
independence here is overly general, and preserves a costly but nearly useless simplicity. 
With an advantageous interdependence, the observation of a planning outcome using one 
bias might be informative about many others. We, the implementors, are at liberty to 
design bias flexibility any way we like. We may hope to derive some advantage by 
carefully structuring our flexibility. Schema-based (or skeletal) planners [ 26 ] provide 
a particularly flexible bias structure. 
In a schema planner, planning techniques are encoded as generalized solutions (called 
schemata). The system solves problems by retrieving an appropriate general pattern and 
instantiating it to fit the particular problem. To illustrate, consider the goal of getting to 
a distant city. The system might have three schemata relevant to this goal, take-a-bus, 
take-a-commercial-airplane, and take-a-private-car. These encode general 
knowledge about how to employ their respective methods of transportation. The system 
might have many additional schemata not relevant to the transportation goal (for making 
breakfast, for doing laundry, for removing snow from ones sidewalk, ans so on). 
Building upon the characterization of classical planning given in Section 3, a schema 
can be viewed as a mechanism for supplying a set of constraints that depend in part on 
the problem’s initial state and goal. The constraints are sufficient to individuate an action 
sequence intended to solve the problem. Thus, we can define a schema as follows: 
Definition 7. A schema, SC, is a set of constant constraints Csc on action sequences 
together with a function FSC : P 4 C” U A that maps a planning problem into either a 
set of additional constraints or the special symbol A. 
The symbol A is interpreted as indicating that the schema’s preconditions are not 
satisfied by the problem. If the preconditions are violated, no solution is offered for the 
problem. Otherwise we interpret the union of a schema’s constant and functional con- 
straints as embodying a solution guaranteed to ISolve the planning problem given to it. 
7.1.1. Schema planner adequacy is by problem class 
Notice that problems naturally cluster into problem classes. The potential goals, the 
domain theory, common initial state features, etc. involved in getting to a distant city 
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are different than those involved in having clean clothes. It is convenient and desirable 
to allow a place for this knowledge. The class of a problem can be very useful to a 
schema-based planner. We will assume problem classes are pre-existing and that it is 
easy for the planner to tell which class a problem is from. This is not to say that it is 
necessarily easy to know which schemata apply to a problem. Schema applicability is 
determined by the satisfiability of each schema’s preconditions. The pre-existing classes 
into which problems fall reflect whatever a priori knowledge we desire to express about 
natural problem types. We may view all problems as coming from a single class. We will 
assume, however, that in the world’s distribution, problems appear from each problem 
class with a finite nonzero probability. 
It is desirable to take problem classes into account in computing planner adequacy. 
Some problem classes (like block stacking) are much easier than others (like bridge 
building). If we interpret adequacy as applying to the planner as a whole, then the 
system is free to balance poor performance on some problem classes against excellent 
performance on others. The system might unfairly exploit a discrepancy in problem 
difficulty achieving over-all adequacy through flawless execution of block stacking to 
make up for creating piles of rubble instead of bridges. This violates the spirit of real- 
world adequacy even though it may be faithful to the letter of the definition. Thus, 
we require that each individual problem class achieve the user’s adequacy requirement 
independently. 
7.1.2. The bias of schema-based planners 
The collection of all the system’s schemata is its schema library. The bias of a 
schema-based planner is determined by the particular library it possesses. Any schema 
change shifts the bias, even if the replacement schema is only slightly different from 
the original. For example, the take-a-commercial-airplane schema that originally 
prefers Fly By Night Airways may be replaced with one that prefers Reliable Air. The 
planner now has a different collection of schemata and, therefore, a different schema 
library yielding a different planning bias. Note, however, the effect of the change is 
local. Relatively few (and necessarily similar) problems are susceptible to the change. 
Other tasks (making breakfast, getting groceries, stacking blocks, etc.) are all handled 
in the very same way under the new bias. 
With the bias of a planner supplied by a schema library, the bias space exhibits the 
kind of interdependence we hoped for. The bias space grows exponentially with the 
number of problem classes, but evidence against one bias element counts as evidence 
against all other biases that contain the offending schema. If the switch to Reliable 
Air results in higher adequacy within a bias in which, say, rental cars are preferred to 
one’s own car, the Whippet bus line is preferred to Pathways, and scrambled eggs are 
preferred to waffles, then it is also likely to be a desirable airline substitution if the car, 
bus, and breakfast preferences are resolved differently. 
7.1.3. An EBL-dejined bias space 
We wish to consider libraries composed of schemata acquired through EBL [ 20,22, 
551 over problems sampled from the planner’s distribution. A number of systems have 
been explored for acquiring planning and problem-solving schemata [56,77,78]. The 
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training example required by EBL is a sample planning problem together with any 
plan that ISolves it. EBL proceeds by explaining the training example in terms of its 
background world knowledge. The explanation is then generalized into a new schema. 
The training example’s explanation can be viewed as a proof tree [ 52,55,57] in which 
the root of the tree is the achieved instance of the problem’s goal, and the leaves are 
elements from the problem’s initial state together with characteristics of the relevant 
actions. The explanation proves that the commitments taken on by the planner together 
with aspects of the initial state and background knowledge entail the goal instance. 
This explanation is generalized by pruning subtrees. This amounts to identifying certain 
subgoals within the proof tree and removing the commitment that these subgoals need 
be realized in the manner they happened to be achieved by the training example. For 
example, a training example might illustrate a particular flight to Baltimore in which Fly- 
by-Night Airways was taken after purchasing a ticket with money obtained from the Old 
Farms Mini-Mall cash machine the previous day. The constraints requiring the money be 
obtained from this (or any) mini-mall cash machine can be pruned leaving the subgoal 
of possessing money to be solved as a schema precondition prior to application. The 
destination, the particular airline selected, and so on can also be generalized subject to 
necessary background knowledge constraints (e.g., that the airline serve the destination). 
This transformation results in a generalized solution schema. 
For our purposes, we will assume that the EBL training example is derived from a 
planning problem drawn by the planner according to the world’s underlying distribution. 
The problem is then given to a sound constraint-searching planner within the EBL system 
that expends resources up to some fixed limit in attempting to solve the problem. If the 
problem can be solved, EBL generalization is applied to the solution yielding in a new 
schema. 
Thus, we will view the EBL system as a partial function mapping problems to 
schemata. There are several wrinkles that must be discussed. First, a number of quite 
different schemata might result from any one problem. Second, there is a possibility that 
the planner internal to the EBL system will fail to ISolve the problem so that no schema 
is constructed. In regards to this latter problem, call the expected proportion of solvable 
problems for the world’s distribution of problems p. We require that p be monotonically 
non-decreasing in the resource bound, R. 
Now let us consider how a single problem can lead to several different schemata. 
Several distinct solutions may exist to a planning problem, resulting in quite different 
EBL training examples (composed of the problem and its solution). Furthermore, there 
may be alternative explanations for a single problem-solution pair [ 721. Finally, there 
may be alternative generalizations possible for a single explanation. Thus, a problem 
corresponds to a set of schemata any one of which may be produced by the EBL system 
depending on the internal arbitrary choices made during processing. 
7.1.4. Honest EBL and conformable schema application 
When given a problem, we will require that the underlying EBL system produce 
at random one of the schemata from the set of possible schemata. Furthermore, the 
generation process must be somewhat fair. We require that any schema that can in 
principle be produced will be produced from the problem with no less than some finite 
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minimal probability, pmin. That is, we exclude EBL systems that can hide schemata 
behind vanishingly small construction probabilities. From this it follows that a problem 
can lead to only a finite number of schemata, in fact no more than l/p,i,. This is usually 
the case in EBL applications. However, the requirement is not met by an important but 
less well-studied class of schemata in which real-valued parameters appear. For now, we 
simply note that our results do not hold for domains in which a single problem may 
lead to an unboundedly large number of schemata. When we refer to an EBL system 
we assume it has this property. Note that this places no upper bound on the number of 
schemata that might be built from the domain’s problems. There may be an unlimited 
number of different problems each of which can introduce a finite number of novel 
schemata. 
We also insist that a schema’s preconditions not be artificially specific; the precon- 
ditions must accurately portray the capabilities of the schema’s body. For example, a 
schema sufficient to ISolve general grocery shopping problems is not allowed to claim 
only to ISolve problems of acquiring dairy products. More formally, there cannot exist 
within the precondition language a more general goal pattern nor a less constraining 
initial state requirement that accurately capture the applicability of the schema. We 
will call such a schema “honest” since it can commit no sin of omission in advertis- 
ing its applicability. We will say an EBL system is honest if it produces only honest 
schemata. Note that we have already forbidden EBL systems the sin of commission. 
A schema’s preconditions cannot falsely claim it is applicable if it will not ISolve the 
problem. 
Our EBL system, then, is assumed to have the following characteristics: We provide it 
with a resource bound R and access to an unlimited set of problems randomly generated 
according to the domain’s distribution D. When given a problem, EBL produces some 
schema with probability p. With probability 1 -p, the EBL system produces A, indicating 
that no schema will be forthcoming. When a schema is produced, it is a random selection 
from the finite set of schemata for which this problem is an illustration. Each element 
appears with probability no less than Pmin. Only schemata that honestly characterize 
their preconditions are produced. For us, an EBL system is characterized by Pmin and p. 
Now we turn briefly to the planner in which the EBL system is embedded. This is 
the consumer of the EBL-acquired schemata. We will say that a schema-based planner 
is “conformable” if a schema can be applied to a problem only if the problem’s goals 
require all of the schema’s goal pattern. To illustrate, consider a schema for achieving 
the conjunctive goal pattern “ON( ?x, ?y) A ON( ?y, ?z)“. This schema is sufficient 
to achieve the simple problem goal “ON(Blkl,Blk3)” but such a use would not be 
conformable since the schema instantiation would also necessarily achieve an unneeded 
ON relation. It might seem more desirable to apply an overly specific schema than to fail 
to produce a solution altogether. However, a schema selection failure conveys important 
information to the learning component about the abilities of the schema-based planner. 
This information is obscured if schemata can be employed in a non-conformable (and 
often inefficient) manner. 
These concepts point to one path around the difficulties with ideal permissive planning. 
Clearly there are alternatives. For our purposes it is enough that some form of permissive 
planning can be made tractable. We can now assemble the formal tractability result: 
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Lemma 8. The probability that a schema which has adequacy T, ESolves a random 
problem of the appropriateproblem class is at least 0, or equivalently, (TO-B),/< a-B). 
Lemma 9. The probability that a schema of adequacy T,, ISolves a random problem 
of the appropriate class is at least 0, or equivalently, (T, - B) /(a - B). 
Lemmas 8 and 9 provide a basis for a statistical adequacy test used by the permissive 
planning algorithm. 
Lemma 10. Given an honest EBL schema acquisition system, L, and a conformable 
schema application planner, A, it is the case that if a planning problem P can be 
ISolved by A using a schema, SC, then SC is acquirable by L from P. 
Thus, there is a two-way bridge between problems and schemata, though the mapping 
is many-to-many. This is important in providing a link from the problems sampled by 
the planner to a set of candidate schemata worth evaluating. 
Lemma 11. If a planner contains a schema, SC, acquirable through honest EBL which 
has adequacy T,, or higher for a problem class, then the probability that EBL will in 
fact construct SC from an arbitrary problem of the appropriate class is at least pmin@, 
or ptin(T,, - P)/<a - PI, w h ere 0 is the normalized utility threshold, a and B are 
adequacy parameters from Definition 1 and pmin is minimum schema probability factor 
of the EBL system. 
Lemma 1 I will play an important role in our tractability results. Informally, it specifies 
a limit to how successfully an adequate schema can hide from random probing. The 
permissive planning algorithm exploits this limit. 
7.2. Single-schema planning 
We now wish to consider a very simple conformable schema-based planner, called a 
single-schema planner. It is given problems drawn from just one problem class and it 
may acquire at most one schema from its bias set by applying honest EBL to problems 
drawn from the world’s fixed unknown distribution. 
Definition 12. Single-schema permissive planning is restricted permissive planning in 
which the planner is a single-schema planner. 
Theorem 13. Single-schema permissive planning is pegormed tractably by algorithm 
SSPP 
By “tractable” we mean that the sample complexity-the number of problems con- 
sumed by the permissive planning algorithm in selecting an adequate bias or determining 
that none exists-is independent of the cardinality of the bias space and is polynomi- 
ally bounded in other relevant parameters ( 1 /O, (Y, p, y, p, 1 /ptin, 1 /E, 1 /a). From the 
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definition of permissive planning, single-schema permissive planning must, with high 
probability, halt with a correct answer. 
Algorithm SSPP(&, 6, T,). 
GLOBAL: a, ,& y 
(* Constants for adequacy computation *) 
GLOBAL: p, pmin 
(* Expected characteristic SEBL solution rate reflecting resource choice *) 
Set 0 = (T,, - p)/(a - p) 
Set M = max( [(3/(pti@) ln(6/S)]) 
(* number of schema hypotheses needed *) 
Set K = [(SpM + 3 + dm)/(6p2)1 
(* number of problems to reliably generate M schemata *) 
Set N = [M. 2((r - r)/(e26)l 
(* number of problems needed to test a hypothesis *) 
Set Tried = 0 
Set Schemas = 0 
WHILE (Tried < K) and (Schemas < M) DO 
Set Tried = Tried + 1 
Get a problem Ph 
(* a problem for hypothesis generation *) 
Set SC = SEBL( 4) 
Set Asc = 0 
IF SC # A BEGIN 
Set Schemas = Schemas + 1 
REPEAT N times 
Get a problem P, 
(* a problem for hypothesis testing *> 
Apply SC to Pt to yield PLAN 
IF PLAN = A THEN Asc = Asc + /? 
ELSE IF Execute(PLAN) achieves Goal( P,) THEN Asc = Asc f a 
ELSE Asc = Asc + y 
END REPEAT 
END BEGIN IF 
Asc = &c/N 
IF Asc > T, THEN Exit SSPP with SC 
END WHILE 
Exit SSPP with A 
Informally, the algorithm attempts to construct and evaluate as many as M schemata. 
M is chosen so that if an adequate schema exists, it is unlikely to be missed in all M 
trials. Each resulting schema is subjected to a statistical adequacy test composed of N 
sample problems for which solutions are generated and tested in the world. N is chosen 
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so that the measured adequacy is unlikely to differ very much from the schema’s true 
adequacy. Since some problems may not yield schemata, a larger number, K, problems 
must be used to build the M schemata. K is chosen to probabilistically guarantee at 
least M schemata will result. 
It is somewhat surprising that the higher the adequacy threshold, the easier for per- 
missive planning. One might expect that it would take longer to find a good schema 
than a mediocre one. Upon reflection the true becomes quite intuitive. A schema of high 
adequacy must correctly apply to many problems and, from Lemma 10, each of these 
problems can give rise to the schema through EBL. Thus, statistically, random probing 
affords many more opportunities to learn a highly adequate schema than one that is 
marginally adequate. On the other hand, if a few random probings all fail, we can be 
quite certain that no extremely adequate schema exists. 
7.3. The DBl planner 
Consider a slightly more complicated planner called a DBl planner that may have at 
most one schema for each of a finite number of problem classes and whose bias space, 
as above, is define through honest EBL over its distribution of problems. 
Definition 14. DBl permissive planning is restricted permissive planning in which the 
planner is a DBl planner. 
Theorem 15. DBI permissive planning is tractable provided that problems appear for 
each problem class with some nonzero lower bound probability plb. 
7.4. The bias space complexi 
We now turn to considerations of the intrinsic complexity of the bias space. We wish 
to develop an intuition for why permissive planning under the conditions outlined above 
should be tractable. We confine this brief investigation to single-schema permissive 
planning where adequacy is the measure of effective real-world single-schema planning 
over a fixed but unknown distribution of problems. 
The difficulty of a learning task is associated with its Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) 
dimension [ 101. The VC dimension is defined for classification learning. We are inter- 
ested not in classification but in learning to plan adequately. To employ this complexity 
machinery, we define a classification task that is closely related to our planning task. 
The classification task is designed to have the property that any solution is, with high 
probability, also a solution to a single-schema permissive planning task. We show that 
the VC dimension for this related classification task is low, 
A classification learning task requires a source of labeled examples that illustrate 
some target concept along with a space of concept hypotheses. The task is to select an 
element from the hypothesis space, through examination of the labeled examples, that 
is likely to be a good approximation to the underlying target concept. 
We augment a standard single-schema permissive planning task with two additional 
provisions: ( 1) all problems are ISolvable (so that each problem can be unambiguously 
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labeled as a positive or negative example) and (2) some adequate schema exists. 
We define a classification task, CT(n) as follows: Let the example source for our 
classification task be the permissive planner’s source of planning problems. Let the 
hypothesis space be a set of n candidate bias schemata constructed by applying honest 
EBL to n initial planning problems drawn from the example source. Each hypothesis 
partitions the space of examples into positive instances (those for which the schema 
supplies a plan that ESolves the problem) and negative instances (those for which the 
schema supplies no plan or whose plan does not ESolve the problem). A solution to 
the CT(n) classification task is any element of the hypothesis space that achieves the 
desired adequacy T,. 
Lemma 16. Let 
-In 1 
1 
lzo = Prni”@ 
0 
r] . 
Then with probability 1 -v any solution to CT( no) yields a solution to the corresponding 
single-schema permissive planning task. 
Lemma 16 assures us that the classification task has the desired relation to single- 
schema permissive planning. Remember that we are not interested in an algorithm that 
actually solves the classification task, but in characterizing the VC dimension of the 
hypothesis set. This is provided by Theorem 17: 
Theorem 17. The VC dimension of the CT(na) task is no greater than 
1% (&&))- 
The log of a polynomial function grows only quite slowly. While a high VC dimension 
is associated with intrinsically difficult learning tasks, a low VC dimension indicates 
that the task may admit to efficient learning. The implication of Theorem 17 is that 
restricted permissive planning itself may be tractable. This result lends strength and 
generality to results stated in Theorems 13 and 15. Equally important is the assurance 
it conveys that there is nothing special about the SSPP algorithm nor any subtleties 
hidden within it. Computer algorithms can be difficult to fully appreciate because the 
vocabulary employed is extremely expressive. Important features may first appear to 
be insignificant implementation details. By Theorem 17 we see that the problem itself 
has a very modest VC dimension. One can reasonably expect to find many alternative 
algorithms that would perform similarly. 
8. Permissive planning in the real world 
All forma1 results including those of the previous section should be treated with 
suspicion until confirmed with empirical support. This is not to say that a proven 
theorem or lemma does not hold, but only that its statement, though correct, may be 
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irrelevant in the real world. From a formal point of view, “tractable” complexity is 
typically taken to mean “polynomially bounded growth”. In the real world, “tractable” 
requires reasonable values of the complexity function as well as reasonable growth. If 
the coefficients are sufficiently large, an algorithm’s example complexity may require 
more observations than the real world can reasonably supply. Even though the cost of 
running the algorithm grows very slowly, it may be prohibitively expensive. 
This is particularly true in the case of robotic planning. Here we may tolerate tens 
or even hundreds of learning episodes. But training a physical robot through thousands 
of examples begins to be expensive and a million robot experiences is far too many 
regardless of how flat the complexity function is at that point. 
Yet, one million is a very small number in the context of the richness of robotic 
behavior. Even a modest robot arm can exist in well over ten billion distinguishable 
states. An action sequence may involve selecting from this set hundreds or thousands of 
times. 
In this section we examine how permissive planning and the view of alteration of 
planner bias through machine learning can benefit a real-world robotic planning sys- 
tem. Where might real-world difficulties be lurking in the theoretical results? The first 
troublesome point concerns the determination of a consistent hypothesis. Many PAC 
results including those of the previous section depend on efficiently finding an element 
from the hypothesis space that is consistent with the known data. The previous section 
establishes that random probing combined with empirical testing suffices. While fine 
for tiny hypothesis spaces or ones dense with acceptable elements, random probing is 
intractable from a practical point of view for hypothesis spaces that are large and sparse. 
A second difficulty concerns the important relationship between observed problems 
and potential schemata. We assumed a finite minimal schema production probability, 
pkn. As noted in the last section, this assumption implies that a problem can lead 
to no more than l/pmin schemata. We also noted that such an assumption is violated 
for schemata in which real-valued parameters appear. A robot planning schema often 
involves just such real-valued parameters. Gripper forces, friction coefficients, preferred 
joint speeds, etc. may take on many different values, and each combination of preferred 
values embodies a distinct bias for that schema’s problems. 
The existence of such continuities implies an infinitesimal Pmin. The requirement of a 
finite ptin allows SSPP to test schemata in isolation while maintaining “tractability”. We 
did not need to understand the implication of one schema’s failure to any other schema. 
There is no analog to the Pmin requirement in, say, PAC learning of DNF concepts. 
The success of DNF as a concept representation language in PAC learning can be seen 
as due in part to the straightforward generalization of information it supports. In DNF 
concept learning, a single example can provide evidence against many hypotheses at 
once. 
To be freed of the ptin assumption we must support a method by which the rejection 
of one schema results in the elimination of a large number of additional candidate 
schemata for that problem class, analogous to DNF concept learning. 
The approach we have taken is to diagnose the failure of a schema. The diagnosis 
is used both to guide the selection of the next hypothesis schema and also to eliminate 
from consideration other schemata to which the failure diagnosis applies. In this way the 
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Obstacle Target 
Fig. 4. Plan to reach over an obstacle. 
system can be more directed than simple random probing, eliminating the dependence 
on the confining assumption of ptin. 
While constructing the conventional explanation, the EBL system also constructs 
a qualitative explanation for the schema. Qualitative inferences about the interaction 
of schema parameters can then be drawn. When a schema proves empirically to be 
inadequate, all other schemata which are qualitatively dominated by it can also be 
eliminated. These are schemata whose parameter values qualitatively exacerbate the 
problem for which the schema was rejected according to the qualitative explanation. 
Consider the situation depicted in Fig. 4. Here, a gantry-style robot arm is to reach 
past an obstacle in order to grasp a target block. World objects are modeled as polygons 
positioned on a table. We will suppose that the system has a set of planning operators 
including MOVE-UP(x) , MOVE-LEFT(x), OPEN-GRIPPER(x) to specify how the 
world changes in response to its actions. Further, we require that the operators are 
augmented by a qualitative characterization of their parameterized effects. Thus, the 
argument to MOVE-UP must be greater than zero, and as the argument increases in 
value the final distance of the gripper to the ceiling monotonically decreases. 
The planning problem is a simple one. A solution, depicted by the dotted line trajec- 
tory, is quite easily constructed from the initial state: 
Initial state Solution 
HEIGHT( OBST, 4.7) MOVE-UP( 2.4) 
HEIGHT(TARG, 2.2) MOVE-RIGHT( 8.3) 
WIDTH( OBST, 2.6) OPEN-GRIPPER( 1 .O) 
WIDTH(TARG, 1 .O) MOVE-DOWN( 3.7) 
POSITION( OBST, 4.5) CLOSE-GRIPPER( 1 .O) 
POSITION( TARG, 10.9) 
GRIPPER-AT(2.6,2.1) 
and this solution is readily generalized via EBL into a schema for a class of similar 
problems: 
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Obstacle Target 
Fig. 5. Execution of the reach plan. 
Initial state Solution 
HEIGHT( ?Obstacle, ?OH) MOVE-UP( ?OH - ?GY) 
HEIGHT ( ?Target, ?TH ) MOVE-RIGHT( ?TP - ?GX) 
WIDTH( ?Obstacle, ?OW) OPEN-GRIPPER( ?TW) 
WIDTH ( ?Target , ?TW) MOVE-DOWN( ?OH - ?TH) 
POSITION( ?Obstacle, ?OP) CLOSE-GRIPPER( ?TW) 
POSITION( ?Target, ?TP) 
GRIPPER-AT( ?GX, ?GY) 
The real-world execution of the plan will look more like the one depicted in Fig. 
5. Here, the plan suffers two distinct failures manifested by collisions of the gripper 
with world objects. Each collision arises because of a combination of slightly incorrect 
beliefs: (a) the MOVE-UP action fails to raise the arm as high as expected while the 
obstacle block is taller than believed and (b) the MOVE-RIGHT extends the arm farther 
than expected and the target block is located closer than believed. 
The planning bias of the schema above includes minimally missing the obstacle and 
minimally surrounding the target. The impracticality of such a bias is obvious. However, 
the particular bias is not so important. The relevant point to us is that some bias is 
necessarily embodied and it is unavoidably based on very little experience in the class 
of problems that the schema claims to solve. No matter what the initial bias, we can 
have little confidence in its expected performance. 
When the first failure of Fig. 5 is encountered, permissive planning dictates that the 
schema’s bias be altered. With the additional qualitative knowledge the alteration can be 
directed rather than random. 
First, the observed failure is diagnosed. All the system knows is that the MOVE- 
RIGHT ended prematurely. The failure observation is of an unexpected collision force. 
But there is no way to know the identity of the collising object. The system embodies 
the assumption that represented knowledge is approximate. This says that the real world 
is more likely to be a small perturbation from the represented world than a large one. 
The collision could be with the target block or the table but since the obstacle block is 
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nearest the observed collision point, it is selected as the first candidate in the collision 
explanation. 
Second, a set of qualitatively relevant plan parameters is identified. These are constants 
employed in the executed whose values were not fully entailed during planning. As such 
they represent part of the planner’s bias; the collection of all possible parameter settings 
forms the planner’s bias space. Each constant is examined in light of the explanation to 
identify those whose value may qualitatively influence the failure. Here, there is only 
one such constant. It is the argument to the first action MOVE-UP It is entailed to 
be at least ?OH - ?GY to satisfy the precondition of a clear path for the interrupted 
MOVE-RIGHT. The argument ?OH - ?GY was believed adequate for that purpose. It is 
observed not to be contingent upon this first failure explanation being correct. 
Finally, the bias is adjusted. Qualitatively the likelihood of a collision with the obstacle 
is minimized as the argument to the action MOVE-UP is maximized. The value ?OH - 
?GY, is noted to be too small. The schema is amended by adding a constraint and a 
preference. The constraint encodes the fact that the MOVE-UP argument must be greater 
than the value ?OH - ?GY. The preference is qualitative in nature and specifies that 
expected utility improves as the argument value is increased. From now on the system 
will have a bias of moving as high as possible when reaching over an obstacle. Together 
constraints and preferences constitute a generalized memory of the failure experience to 
influence future processing. 
Such constraints and preferences can focus attention away from many additional 
schemata besides the one evaluated. This is the generalization of experience that was 
discussed earlier. 
It may happen that no additional failure is encountered that can be explained by 
this plan parameter. In that case it has reached an adequate value. On the other hand, 
some later qualitatively different type of failure may occur for the reason that the 
arm is now reaching too high. When such a failure is encountered, the new and quite 
different explanation will post a constraint that the MOVE-UP argument be less than the 
discovered maximal bound. It will also post a qualitative preference that the argument be 
as small as possible. The utility for selecting the argument is then seen as qualitatively 
convex. It increases at the low end of the allowable interval but decreases at the high 
end. Qualitatively the midpoint is the best choice. Further failures would post further 
constraints and preferences. Thus, a rough binary search is realized in pinning down the 
best value of the MOVE-UP argument. 
The system may also encounter a collision while attempting to grasp the target (the 
second collision of Fig. 5). In a similar way the bias is adjusted so that the gripper opens 
as wide as possible when approaching a grasp target. Eventually permissive planning 
produces a solution like the one shown in Fig. 6. 
Fig. 7 diagrams the improved ESolve behavior of the reach-over-obstacle schema. The 
original schema tries to minimally miss the obstacle and minimally open to grasp the 
target. Its real-world success, therefore, is extremely limited. After permissive planning 
the schema applies much more broadly. In this example the result is similar to that 
produced by a planner which incorporates explicit uncertainty reasoning. This need not 
be the case, however. In permissive planning there is no guarantee that the improved 
ESolve coverage will contain the ESolve coverage of the original. Nor is there any 
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Obstacle Target 
Fig. 6. A conservative solution. 
[Solve Universe ESolve 
Fig. 7. Permissive versus original reach schema coverage. 
States of Interest 
- Permissive 
ISolve Univserse ESolve 
Fig. 8. More typical result of permissive planning. 
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guarantee that the ESolve coverage will be larger than that of the original schema, 
although often this is the case. 
Fig. 8 shows a more typical relationship. The permissive planning guarantee is that 
after adjustment, the ESolve behavior will better match the user’s needs. Here, the 
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Fig. 9. The GRASPER system. 
overlap between the permissive ESolve behavior and the states of interest is much 
improved over that of the original schema, although the original ESolve set is not 
contained in the adjusted set. 
An important characteristic of permissive planning is that it does not try to eliminate 
planner weaknesses. Such an approach would be doomed; no planner can solve the 
qualification problem. In permissive planning, planner weaknesses remain but are moved 
away from the kinds of problems that the user asks the system to solve. Likewise, planner 
strengths are brought more into line with the user’s needs. 
9. The GRASPER system 
In this section we present a brief overview of GRASPER, an implemented real-world 
permissive planning robotic system. The system, shown in Fig. 9, consists of a six degree 
of freedom Prab RTX scara-type manipulator, an overhead camera, a frame grabber, and 
an IBM RT computer running Lucid Common Lisp. 
GRASPER plans action sequences to grasp and lift novel objects placed in its 
workspace, such as plastic pieces from a children’s puzzle (Fig. 10). No a priori model 
of the objects are given to the system. They are known only through the silhouette they 
present to the overhead camera. The pixel patterns from the camera are converted into 
simple polygons. Fig. 11 shows a typical object, its contour edges as found by the vision 
system, and its polygonal internal representation. The polygon object representations are 
used for drawing conclusions about spatial occupancy. This representation (like any 
internal representation of a real physical object) is flawed, being only an approximation 
to the actual objects. 
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Fig. 10. The workspace with gripper and pieces. 
Solid blacklinesegmem show 
Fig. 11. An object, the sensed contour, and the represented polygon 
The system includes a typical axiomatization about how objects can be surrounded, 
how closing the gripper applies a friction force between the fingers and the object, 
how sufficient friction establishes a grasp, how a grasped object can be manipulated, 
etc. The axiomatization, like the represented sensory data, captures the real world only 
approximately. The coefficients of friction between the fingers and various objects is 
represented as a single scalar. This is a simplification. Operators to move the arm only 
Fig. 13. A horizontal slipping failure 
approximate the motions they claim to perform. The forces that the robot fingers apply 
to a surrounded object also only approximate the operator’s effects. 
Using its initial knowledge, a plan is constructed to lift a designated object. Not 
surprisingly, the initial plan usually fails in the real world. Figs. 12 and 13 illustrate two 
of the failure modes observed. 
Following the principle of permissive planning, the planning process, rather than the 
domain theory, is blamed for the shortcoming. The planning bias is adjusted. Through 
bias adjustment over several failures, the real-world effects of the schema are made to 
conform to the projection of the original action sequence. The final PICK-UP schema 
can be interpreted as ( 1) squeezing harder than the world knowledge claims is necessary, 
(2) selecting grasp points along faces that are more nearly parallel, (3) selecting grasp 
points closer to the object’s center of geometry than believed necessary, and (4) opening 
the gripper wider than believed necessary while appoaching the target object. 
Figs. 14 and 15 illustrate a typical application of the schema after learning. After bias 
adjustment has occurred, this object, like most novel 2D objects, is correctly grasped 
and lifted on the first attempt. 
Fig. 16 quantitatively illustrates the increased robustness of GRASPER’s PICK-UP 
schema. The solid region indicates how far the real world can vary without causing 
the grasp to fail before and after permissive adjustment. The ESolve envelope is much 
larger for schema after permissive planning indicating that these attributes can vary 
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Fig. 14. Target object with planned finger positions. 
Fig. 15. A successful grasp after permissivization 
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Fig. 16. ESolve envelopes. 
much more widely and still be successfully picked up. Three attributes are represented: 
weight, excess width, and orientation. Other attributes (X & Y position on the table, 
the angle between the grasped faces, and the distance from the center of mass of the 
selected grasp points) would also show improved tolerance. 
The object being grasped is similar to the one in Fig. 15. As heavier target objects are 
attempted by the schema it eventually fails with the target slipping out of the gripper. 
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As shown by the vertical axis this failure occurs at approximately twice the mass in the 
permissively adjusted schema. More interesting is the interaction between the width and 
orientation errors. As the true width increases (the difference between the true width 
and the represented width is shown on the axis extending to the right), the schema’s 
tolerance of orientation errors (the axis perpendicular to the page) quickly decreases. 
Before permissive planning the tolerated variation in orientation is ~tO.09 radians (about 
5 degrees) with an object just 1 cm wider than believed. After permissive planning an 
object 4 cm wider than believed can still be successfully grasped when approached with 
an orientation error of ~tO.64 radians (over 30 degrees). 
The GRASPER system satisfies the requirements of Theorem 13. It is a single-schema 
planner; its only goal is to pick up objects. Exactly one schema is constructed for this 
purpose. The single-schema planner family was defined to establish a formal result, and 
while it is a particularly simple family of planners, GRASPER demonstrates that it is 
not without interesting real-world members. 
How central is learning to GRASPER’s performance? We could have invested in 
more expensive robotics hardware that would support a more certain domain theory. 
This would increase the chance that a grasping episode would fall within the origi- 
nal ESolve envelope of Fig. 16(a). Certainly the hardware supporting the GRASPER 
system is far from the state of the art. With the best available robot arm, with a 
state-of-the-art vision system, with a more sophisticated internal object representation, 
and with carefully crafted planning operators we could have avoided the pitfalls that 
made permissive planning necessary for the GRASPER system. But this would only 
defer the problem. With better hardware the same phenomenon arises at a smaller grain 
size. Manipulating high precision parts is just as susceptible to the qualification prob- 
lem as manipulating GRASPER’s puzzle pieces. Furthermore, improving accuracy is 
an expensive option and is not always available to users. Hardware costs skyrocket 
with higher precision and better reproducibility requirements. Most importantly, such a 
“solution” misses the point of the research. Permissive planning opens a different av- 
enue to achieving adequate real-world performance. One that complements buying more 
expensive hardware. 
Finally, we are making no claims that the GRASPER system solves the general non- 
model-based grasping problem. This is an exceedingly difficult and still open problem 
in robotics. Our claim is only that bias adjustment is an important tool for planners that 
interact with a real world. Robotic grasping is one task where a real-world connection 
is crucial. Thus, GRASPER is an implemented existence proof of the tractability of bias 
adjustment through permissive planning. 
For additional details of the GRASPER system see [5]. Another task to which 
permissive planning has been successfully applied can be found in [61. 
10. Summary and conclusions 
We have outlined an extension of the classical planning paradigm to embrace real- 
world performance. We introduced a distinction between ISolving a planning problem- 
finding a plan that works according to the planner’s micro-world, and ESolving a 
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problem-achieving the goal in the real world. We used these concepts to define the 
notion of planner adequacy. We discussed the planning bias of a planner and argued that 
bias is an inescapable facet of classical planning. We introduced permissive planning 
as a method of improving planner adequacy by purposeful alteration of planner bias. 
This is not a facet of traditional classical planning, which allows no formal connec- 
tion between the system’s internal micro-world and any real world. Permissive planning 
necessarily contains an empirical component. For it is only through observation that 
real-world behavior not captured by the planner’s micro-world definition can be known. 
Thus permissive planning can be viewed as an empirically driven search through a space 
of possible planning biases so as to reduce the discrepancy between the projections of 
action sequences and their real-world effects. While adequacy is enhanced by permissive 
planning, the micro-world behavior and the projection abilities of the planner remain 
unchanged. 
In its ideal form, permissive planning is impossible. However, with modest constraints, 
permissive planning is both possible and tractable. We are able to establish a slightly 
strengthened form of tractability. By convention in computational complexity, something 
is “tractable” if its growth is polynomially bounded. But, an algorithm whose running 
time is polynomial in a feature that is known to be extremely large can paralyze an 
implemented system as surely as hyper-polynomial growth. The one feature of permissive 
planning liable to such characteristics is the bias space. We offer two points to redress 
this concern. First, we can guarantee the algorithmic complexity of permissive planning 
is independent of the cardinality of the bias space. Second, we cite an implemented 
permissive planning robotic planning system as an existence proof that the theoretical 
results can be realized in a real-world planner. 
We show that schema-based planners provide a convenient method to realize bias 
adjustment. In particular, schematic planners exhibit a locality property: changing a 
schema results in alternation of the planner’s bias only in the local context of the schema. 
This yields a desirable form of interdependence among elements of the bias space, 
a key requirement for tractably achieving planner adequacy. However, an important 
topic for future research is to investigate what other forms the bias adjustment can 
take. 
Regardless of how the bias space is realized, one somewhat surprising corollary of 
permissive planning is that minimal commitment plans may not be desirable. This is 
not to say that minimal commitment planning is incompatible with permissive planning. 
It most assuredly is not. It is the form of the output plan that causes difficulty. These 
planners cease the plan refinement process when all plan completions entail the goal 
[ 14, 17,45,68,75,86]. But the planner’s output must be linearized into a single action 
sequence for executing in most real-world domains. This is done after planning ceases 
and is not part of the minimal commitment planning process proper. Thus, only a 
portion of the bias inherent in the executed action sequence is due to the planner. 
Any permissive adjustment of a minimal commitment planner is denied influence over 
that portion of the bias exhibited by plan linearization. To remedy this, the linearizing 
decisions must also be subject to bias control. One might attempt to exert a permissive 
planning-like control over both the planner and linearizer, but this introduces the artificial 
and potentially difficult complication of coordinating bias adjustment between the two 
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interacting bias spaces. A preferable solution is to put the linearization decisions back 
into the planner. The planner may still employ minimal commitment principles in making 
planning decisions, but it would not be allowed to cease making decisions until a totally 
ordered action sequence is produced. 
Permissive planning is, in essence, an approach to planning with uncertainty. The 
centrality of machine learning sets it apart from most conventional approaches such 
as planning for sensing [34,63], decision theoretic planning [ 19,31,32], preimage 
backchaining [25,42,43 1, and disjunctive planning [ 69,76 J 
Its close tie to classical planning makes it quite different from the reactive approaches 
[ 1,29,44], and it has little in common with the fuzzy control approach [ 8,241. As in 
conventional symbolic AI, everything is done using “crisp” representations. There are 
no fuzzification or de-fuzzification steps. 
Much previous research has applied machine learning techniques to planning. Usually, 
machine learning is employed to improve the accuracy of a planner’s mode1 of the world. 
This includes acquiring or adjusting operator definitions [ 13,21,35], reinforcement 
learning [37,X$79,84], and scientific discovery [62,71]. This alters the planner’s 
projection ability rather than its bias. The chunking of control knowledge (e.g., [41,50, 
881) can be viewed as altering planner bias as can some case-based approaches [ 2,331 
though in these systems there is no formal connection to planner adequacy, which is 
central to permissive planning. 
This is not to say that permissive planning is necessarily preferable to other uncertainty 
approaches. The approaches are different, each has its strengths and weaknesses. Some 
important strengths of permissive planning are ( 1) it offers a forma1 connection to a 
complex and fundamentally unmodelable real world, (2) a single adjustment of the 
planning bias can mitigate several domain theory flaws, for example in the GRASPER 
system, opening the gripper wider to surround the object helps alleviate uncertainties 
about its position, orientation, and shape, (3) desirable features of classical planning, 
such as domain independence and guarantee of (ISolve) correctness are retained as is 
the benefit from the extensive literature and prior research on classical planning, (4) 
it preserves the representations supplied by the human domain expert which may well 
embody a deep coherence based upon his own hard-fought experiences with the world. 
Permissive planning also exhibits some notable weaknesses: (1) it requires a declar- 
ative treatment of planner bias; this adds a new and potentially difficult dimension to 
the design of a planner, (2) potentially costly real-world failures must be experienced, 
and (3) the acquired knowledge does not apply in different contexts. Unlike approaches 
that refine internal domain representations, permissive planning learns to identify and 
avoid contexts that lead to problematic interactions rather than fixing the underlying 
discrepancies. This is the flip side of advantage (2) above. 
In a broad sense, permissive planning can be viewed as learning to be conservative in 
choosing actions. Why not simply build a preference for conservative choices into the 
planner to begin with? The answer is that being conservative is context dependent. It is 
sensitive to the pragmatics of the situation and to empirical tradeoffs in the world. These 
cannot be properly specified without examining the real world. For example, in a sparse 
workspace GRASPER is conservative if it opens its gripper as wide as possible before 
approaching a target piece. In a cluttered workspace, however, excessive opening may 
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cause new collisions with other objects. To be most conservative it learns to open to 
an intermediate amount guided by the observed failures. Likewise, closing more tightly 
than believed necessary is conservative in case the believed coefficient of friction is low. 
But squeezing harder can be destructive if the objects are fragile. 
Finally, we wish to offer a more abstract (and more speculative) interpretation of the 
permissive planning approach. Let us consider the role of the domain theory, includ- 
ing operator definitions, object descriptions, etc. What kind of domain theory leads to 
acceptable planning behavior? For a conventional planner, accuracy is paramount. It is 
only through faithfulness of the domain theory to the external world that the planner’s 
output can be trusted to achieve what it claims to achieve. Domain theory accuracy is 
also the crucial issue for many learning planners. Learning is most often directed toward 
refining internal representations of the domain theory when discrepancies are detected. 
Permissive planning changes this. The primary concern is still that the planner’s out- 
put do in the real world what it claims to do. But this no longer translates directly 
into a requirement for the domain theory to be accurate. The plans constructed by a 
permissivized planner reflect both the domain theory and the permissivized changes 
to the planner’s bias. The permissivization procedure affords a degree of freedom in 
the planner’s behavior beyond the dictates of the domain theory. What makes a good 
domain theory for a permissive planner? The best domain theory is the one that rc- 
sults in the best behavior after permissive bias adjustment. An inaccurate domain theory 
that allows more effective permissive adjustment may be more desirable than a more 
accurate domain theory that allows little adjustment. The shift may seem small but 
the implications can be profound. A similar issue arises in [ 211. Correctness is now 
but a heuristic to be used as a guide in crafting the domain theory. In the GRASPER 
system simple polygons are employed to represent object shapes. These are known to 
be inaccurate in ways that would be pernicious to a conventional planner. However, 
GRASPER’s permissive planning (which employs the same simplified representations) 
exhibits much more effective final behavior than if it were reasoning about the intricate 
complexities of objects’ true silhouettes. The simplicity of the data representations to- 
gether with the conservative bias to open wider than necessary yield planning that is 
both efficient and effective in the real world. This ability to tolerate less than perfect 
axioms can greatly simplify the task of the system implementor. Without it the imple- 
mentor shoulders the impossible task of producing a perfectly accurate set of axioms. 
In reality this degenerates into a game to spread and hide the imperfections so that 
their mutual negative interactions are unlikely to be discovered by the anticipated lines 
of inference that the system will likely explore (which the implementor is now forced 
to anticipate). Using permissive planning, one can adopt domain axiom sets with la- 
tent inconsistencies, relying on empirical refinement to select preferences for adequate 
planning behavior. Not all types of inconsistencies can be tolerated; one cannot start 
with gibberish and expect permissive planning to sort things out. We hope that the 
kind of inconsistencies tolerated include the kind one tends to get as the initial world 
model from a domain expert. If this is the case permissive planning may be of great 
use in helping to understand what experts mean when they are forced to express their 
expertise in a formal language. But this is as yet only a hope and a question for later 
investigations. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of lemmas and theorems 
Lemma 4. The simplified formulation of ideal permissive planning cannot be realized. 
Proof, Under the conditions of simplified ideal permissive planning, the biases are 
independent Bernoulli random variables. We can know their characteristics only by 
sampling problems according to the user’s interest and observing success or failure. 
This is precisely the discrete time minimax bandit problem with two Bernoulli arms as 
the horizon N grows without bound. A permissive planning algorithm is any decision 
procedure which after a finite sampling of the two biases selects, once and for all, the 
better of the two. This correspond to a regret function that is asymptotically flat in N. 
An important result from the bandit literature is that the optimal regret function grows 
at least as a. Since no regret function can, under these conditions, be asymptotically 
flat, no algorithm can realize simplified permissive planning. 0 
Theorem 3. Ideal permissive planning cannot be realized. 
Proof. The theorem follows directly from Lemma 4. By choosing a bias space of 
cardinality two, and choosing y = /3, any ideal permissive planning algorithm necessarily 
satisfies the more restrictive conditions of the lemma. Since no algorithm can satisfy the 
lemma’s restrictive conditions, the more general case is also impossible to realize. 0 
Lemma 8. The probability that a schema which has adequacy T, ESolves a random 
problem of the appropriateproblem class is at least 0, or equivalently, (T,-/3)/(a-p). 
Proof. Consider a schema of adequacy TO applied to a random problem of the appro- 
priate class drawn from the universe and distribution of (1). Let r be the probability 
that such a problem is both ISolved and ESolved, p be the probability that it is not 
attempted by the schema, and 4 be the probability that it is ISolved but not ESolved. 
The definition of adequacy (1) can be written as 
T,, = ra + p/I + qy. (Al) 
Suppose the lemma is violated for some schema. Then for that schema r < (cl - 
P)/<a - P) h’ h w lc can be rewritten as T, > rLy + ( I - r)/3. With (A.1) we have 
rcu+p/?+py>ra+(l--r)florqr> (I-p-r)P.Butr+p+q=l becausethese 
probabilities exhaust the possible outcomes. So it must be the case that y > p. This 
contradicts the definitional requirement that y 6 p < 0 < a proving the lemma. 0 
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Lemma 9. The probability that a schema of adequacy T, ISolves a random problem of 
the appropriate class is at least 0, or equivalently, (T,! - B)/(a - B). 
Proof. This follows from the proof of Lemma 8 which established this as a lower bound 
on problems that are both ISolved and ESolved. There can be no fewer problems that 
are ISolved without regard to being ESolved. q 
Lemma 10. Given an honest EBL schema acquisition system, L, and a conformable 
schema application planner, A, it is the case that if a planning problem P can be 
ISolved by A using a schema, SC, then SC is acquirable by L from P. 
Proof (Sketch). We can think about each schema as embodying a planning strategy 
that can be applied directly, without recourse to searching the constraint tree. Acquiring 
planning schemata through EBL can be viewed as the process of 
( 1) observing an instance that illustrates an unknown strategy, 
(2) explaining why the instance works, 
(3) abstracting away unneeded and easily rederivable details of the example to yield 
a general characterization of the illustrated strategy. 
If a planning strategy suffices to solve a problem, then some from-scratch plan can be 
constructed (by the planner underlying the EBL component) which is an example of the 
strategy. This plan, suitably explained, can therefore be generalized back into the original 
strategy. Of course, alternate from-scratch solutions might lead to other strategies, and, 
therefore, other schemata. But among the schemata acquirable from the planning problem 
must be the originally postulated schema. The only wrinkle in transforming this informal 
argument into a proof is to insure a tight fit between the problem and the strategy: the 
problem solution must necessarily illustrate all facets of the strategy. This property is 
enforced by the honesty and conformability requirements. 0 
Lemma 11. If a planner contains a schema, SC, acquirable through honest EBL which 
has adequacy T, or higher for a problem class, then the probability that EBL will in 
fact construct SC from an arbitrary problem of the appropriate class is at least pminO, 
or pti,U, - P>/<a - P>, w h ere 0 is the normalized utility threshold, a and B are 
adequacy parameters from Definition 1 and pin is minimum schema probability factor 
of the EBL system. 
Proof. By hypothesis, the planner contains a schema of adequacy at least T,,. Call that 
schema SC. From Lemma 9 the expected ISolve solution rate of SC over relevant 
problems is at least (TO - B)/(a - B). F rom Lemma 10 we know that each of the 
ISolvable problems could in principle give rise to the acquisition of SC through honest 
EBL. Thus, the expected fraction of problems of the appropriate class that could in 
principle give rise to SC is (Z, - p)/( cy - /3). F or us, the minimum probability with 
which EBL produces a particular schema from a problem is pmin. Thus, the probability 
that SC is produced by EBL on a random problem of the appropriate type is at least 
pmin(T, - P>/(a -PI, or by the definition of 0, ptinO. !I 
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Theorem 13. Single-schema permissive planning is pelformed tractably by algorithm 
SSPP 
Proof. The algorithm always halts: From the loop structure, the algorithm’s time com- 
plexity is 0( KN). As many as K problems are drawn in the outer loop. For as many as 
M (with M < K) iterations, the inner loop is executed N times drawing one problem in 
each iteration. Thus, the sample complexity is bounded by K + MN. The parameters M, 
K, and N are assigned values that are independent of the cardinality of the bias space 
and polynomial in the other relevant parameters. There are two ways the algorithm might 
yield an incorrect aswer: (1) it may output A, failing to find an adequate schema when 
one exists or (2) it may halt with an inadequate schema (whether or not an adequate 
one exists). The first error is a false negative. The second is a false positive. It suffices 
to show that Pr(false negative) < 6/2 and Pr(false positive) < 6/2. A false positive 
results if any one of the M hypothesized schemata is incorrectly judged to be adequate. 
To avoid a false positive, it suffices that c, 6; < S/2 where 6i is the independent prob- 
ability that the ith hypothesized schema will be falsely confirmed as adequate. Thus, 
it suffices to show that Si 6 S/(2M) for each i. Each test applies its schema to N 
sample problems from which the sample adequacy is computed. Provided the variance 
over a randomly sampled distribution is finite, Chebyshev’s inequality provides a useful 
relation for PAC-style proofs: 
2 
Pr(lp-_l 3 A) < ~ 
A2N 
(A.21 
where m and g2 are the true mean and true variance respectively of a random variable 
X, and the symbol x represents the measured mean of N samples of X. A is positive. 
The relation quantifies the probability of observing a measured mean very different from 
the true mean. 
Let 
l SC be a hypothesized schema under evaluation, 
l A,Y be the computed sample adequacy of SC over N random problems, 
l A, be the (unknown) true adequacy of SC over the underlying distribution. 
The underlying distribution of adequacies is trinomial: each sample problem adequacy 
is cy, p, or y. So p2 is also finite and Chebyshev’s inequality applies to the adequacy 
of SC. For any positive A 
Pr(IA, - AtI 3 A) < 3. (A.3) 
A necessary and sufficient condition for SC to be judged a false positive is that its 
sample adequacy is measured to be at least the desired adequacy threshold but its true 
adequacy is less than the threshold by at least e: (A, > T,) A (AI < T, - E). Thus, a 
sufficient condition for avoiding a false positive is that for each test 
IA, - A,1 < e (A.4) 
Chebyshev provides a bound on the probability that inequality (A.4) is violated: 
Pr( lA,s - AtI > E) < 3. 
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It suffices to choose N according to 
N>M,2(-P) / &2S 
which is respected by the algorithm. N is independent of the cardinality of the bias 
space (the number of entertainable schemata) and that it is polynomially bounded in 
the other parameters provided M is likewise bounded which will be established shortly. 
The probability of a false negative must also be bounded by S/2. For a false negative 
condition to arise there must exist at least one adequate schema but the algorithm 
claims none exists. There are three ways the algorithm might result in a false negative. 
First, the K sampled problems may be sufficiently difficult that fewer than M can be 
solved. In this case, the algorithm cannot construct the requisite M random hypothesis 
schemata. Call this false negative failure Fn,i. The second type of failure results in case 
no adequate schema is entertained among the A4 hypotheses. We call this Ff,,2. Finally, 
it is possible that one or more adequate schemata are hypothesized but they are judged 
to be inadequate by the statistical adequacy tests. Call this failure Ffn3. There are no 
other ways a false negative can occur. Thus, we require that 
Pr(%) +Pr(%) +Pr(%) < f 
It suffices to show Pr( Ff,,, ) < S/6 and Pr( Ffn2) < 6/6 and Pr( Ff,3) 6 6/6. First, 
we consider Ff,l. We show for the given method of selecting K that with probability 
1 -a/6 at least M of the K sampled problems are solvable. Since every solvable problem 
yields a schema through EBL, we will be probabilistically guaranteed to entertain the 
requisite number of schemata. We assume the difficulty of a problem is an independent 
property of the problem. Provided the resources allocated to the EBL planner are in the 
right ballpark for the intrinsic difficulties of the problem class, this assumption seems 
reasonable. Let us define a new random variable S. Si is 1 if problem i is solved within 
the resources allowed and 0 if it is not. The mean of S, of course, is p, the expected 
proportion of problems that can be solved. If we choose K to be M/p then there is an 
even chance that at least M of the problems are solvable. But an even chance is not 
good enough. We must limit the chance of getting fewer than M solvable problems to 
S/6. Let fi be the observed solution rate corresponding to the true rate, p. We require 
Pr 
Kp - M 
p - pr 3 ~ 
K (A.5) 
If we let the number of samples be K, define A = (Kp - M)/K, and note that the 
variance of S is at most 1, then Chebyshev assures us that 
(A.61 
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The left-hand side of (A.5) is weaker than that of (A.6) since Chebyshev provides 
an unneeded bound on how much higher the observed solution rate, K, can be than the 
true rate, p. We require only that the observed rate not often be much smaller. If we 
can choose K so that 
1 <C or K>6pM+3+&JGG 
( > 
Kp-M 2K16 ’ G2 
K 
the SSPP algorithm chooses K consistent with this bound which is independent of 
the size of the bias space and polynomial in the other parameters. However, M again 
appears linearly. Thus, a tractable number of examples can probabilistically guarantee a 
low probability of Fr”t again on the tractability of M. 
Next we turn to the possibility that no adequate schema is among the M hypothesized 
schemata though one exists. We require that this probability also respect the bound 
Pr(&T) 6 6/6. Let SC be an adequate schema. We know an adequate schema exists 
or the false negative condition could not arise. By Lemma 11, if a random schema is 
acquired using a randomly sampled problem, the probability that the constructed schema 
will be the adequate schema SC is at least pm;“@. Conversely, the probability that the 
randomly acquired schema is not SC is no greater than 1 - p,i,(T, - p)/( (Y - j?). 
Repeated randomly acquired schemata are independent events. Thus, the probability that 
M attempts all fail to acquire SC is no greater than 
l _ prnin(Tct -P) M 
ff-P > 
which we wish to be bounded by S/6. Solving for M, this constraint is met by 
M3 (A.7) 
This establishes the tractability of M which was also required previously. 
Finally, there is the possibility that an entertained adequate schema fails its confir- 
mation test and is incorrectly judged to be inadequate. We require Pr(Fr”s) < S/6. A 
necessary and sufficient Ffn3 failure condition is that a schema’s sample adequacy is 
measured to be less than the desired adequacy threshold but its true adequacy is at least 
E greater than the threshold: A, < A, - F. Again, a sufficient condition for avoiding 
this form of false positive is inequality (A.4). This is precisely the false positive error 
condition. There we required a sufficiently large N to bound the error probability of 
each test by 6/(2M). Here we need to bound the error probability of each test by S/6. 
The algorithm chooses M to be at least 3. Thus, the probability for a false negative and 
the probability for a false positive are each required to be no greater than 6/2, so the 
algorithm produces the correct answer with probability at least 1 - 6, completing the 
proof. 0 
Theorem 15. Class-wise DBI permissive planning is tractable provided that problems 
appear for each problem class with some nonzero lower bound probability p/t,. 
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Proof (Sketch). Again, tractability requires the sample complexity to be independent 
of the bias space cardinality and polynomial in the other relevant parameters. The DBl 
planner adds the complication of C classes whose problems may appear with different 
probabilities, though none with less than a fixed minimum probability, p/b. Recall that 
the adequacy of a schema-based planner is by problem class, that problem classes are 
predefined. Thus, for permissive planning to succeed, a permissive planning algorithm 
must terminate after consuming only a polynomial number of examples. For each class 
the planner either outputs A, indicating that it believes no adequate schema can be 
constructed for the class, or it adopts a single schema that probabilistically meets the 
adequacy requirements. Each such schema is then applied to all problems of its class. 
The theorem’s proof follows directly from Theorem 13. For C classes, we simply 
start C independent single-schema permissive planning algorithms funneling each class 
of problems to a separate instance of the algorithm. The planner’s behavior must be 
correct with confidence 1 - 6. This is assured if each algorithm instance is required 
to meet the tighter confidence bound 6’ = 6/C. The convergence rate of the slowest 
converging algorithm instance determines the bound for the composite algorithm. That 
algorithm instance can expect to see a diluted stream of examples whose dilution factor 
is no worse than P&. Thus, the composite sample complexity is no worse than that 
instance’s complexity further inflated by a factor of 1 /JQ,. These alterations increase the 
sample complexity by only polynomial factors. The sample complexity of the composite 
algorithm is therefore still plynomially bounded, though it is, of course, now sensitive 
to the number of classes, C, and the lower bound class probability occurrence, ,o//~. 0 
Lemma 16. Let 
a-P no = In L 
0 Pmi”(T,, -PI 71 
Then with probability 1 -v any solution to CT( no) yields a solution to the corresponding 
single-schema permissive planning task. 
Proof. The derivation of this bound is analogous to the derivation of Eq. (A.7). The 
probability that IZO attempts all fail to acquire the assumed adequate schema SC is no 
greater than 
1 _ Pmin(T, -PI no 
ff-P > . 
We are interested in characterizing no such that 
which simplifies to 
110 3 
a-P 1 
pmin(T,-PI In i ’ 0 
214 G.E DeJong, S. W. Bennett/Artijicml Intelligence 89 (1997) 173-217 
Theorem 17. The VC dimension of the CT( no) task is no greater than 
Proof. The IZO elements in the hypothesis concept can shatter a set of at most log, (no) 
examples. By definition, the VC dimension is the cardinality of the largest set shattered 
by the set of hypotheses. 0 
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